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to be nobody but yourself-in a world which is doing its best, 
night and day, to 
make you everybody else, means to fight the hardest battle that 
any human being 
can fight, and never stop fighting. 
                                                                                                           -e. e. Cummings 
 
 
Western social theorists have long pondered the relationship between self-perception and social 
perception, that is, the relationship between the ways we interpret and evaluate our own actions, 
feelings, and personal characteristics and the ways we interpret and evaluate those of other social 
actors.  Within social psychology, in particular, some theorists have stressed connections or 
parallels between these two processes (Bem 1967, 1972; Cooley 1902; Mead 1934; Nisbett and 
Wilson 1977; Schachter 1964), while others have emphasized divergences or differences (Jones 
1990; Jones and Nisbett 1971; Storms 1973; Taylor and Fiske 1978).  What theorists in both 
camps have shared, however, is a willingness to speak of an abstract, decontextualized self, and 
perhaps even more remarkably, of an abstract, undifferentiated other. 
The recent flowering of cultural psychology in general (Fiske et al. 1997; Shweder 1991; 
Stigler, Shweder, and Herdt 1990; Triandis 1995), and the increasing attention to different 
cultural constructions of the self in particular (Markus and Kitayarna 1991; Nisbett and Cohen 
1996; Shweder and Bourne 1982; Triandis 1989), makes it appropriate to reexamine some of the 
classic theories and generalizations that Western researchers have offered regarding self and 
other.  In doing so, however, we want to introduce into cultural discussions a distinction 
regarding "others" that seems notably absent in the discussions of self-perception versus social 
perception introduced in our opening paragraph—namely, the familiar distinction between 
"ingroup" and "outgroup" members. 
The distinction itself, of course, is hardly new.  Western investigators have long 
recognized that social perceivers may stereotype, assume homogeneity in, and show hostility 
toward outgroup members (Allport 1954; Jones, Wood, and Quattrone 1981; Jones 1972/1997; 
Sherif 1966; Sherif and Sherif 1953) while displaying favoritism toward ingroup members 
(Gaertner and Dovidio 1986; Gaertner et al., this volume; McConahay 1986; Moscovici 1984; 
Tajfel 1970, 1981).  Other investigators, notably those working in the social-comparison 
tradition (Festinger 1954; Taylor 1983; Tesser 1980, 1988) and the reference-group tradition 
(Crosby 1976; Newcomb 1943; Newcomb et al. 1967), have continually emphasized that self-
assessments hinge not only on comparisons with other people in general but also on comparisons 
of one's attitudes, abilities, wealth, or well-being with those of socially relevant members of 
one's group. 
Nevertheless, deep within the theoretical bedrock of contemporary Western social 
psychology, one finds seemingly straightforward claims about how individuals respond to the 
actions of "others," or to the attempts of "others" to influence them, without qualification 
concerning the identity of these "others" or the relevant relationship between the parties.  In fact, 
the methodologies adopted by our field in its search for presumably universal laws and 
generalizations that are somehow independent of social context have led some to describe the 
heart of experimental social psychology, in the United States at least, as the study of “strangers 
in strange situations" (Aron and Aron 1986).1 
Two such general claims regarding self-contained selves versus generalized others 
provide the empirical and theoretical focus of this chapter.  The first claim postulates a 
"divergence" in attributions and inferences regarding self and other, or "actor" and "observer" 
(Jones and Nisbett 1971; Nisbett et al. 1973).  The second claim proposes that there are 
differences between the affective and motivational consequences of choices made by the self and 
those of choices suggested to, or imposed on, the self by others (Cordova and Lepper 1996; 
deCharms 1968; Deci 1981; Lepper and Greene 1978; Zuckerman et al. 1978). 
Recently, we have examined the cultural standing of both of these claims in research that deals 
explicitly with the ingroup-outgroup distinction and utilizes both Western and non-Western 
research participants. Before we turn to the details of these research efforts, however, it may be 
useful to consider, at least briefly, the current status of “culture” in American social psychology 
more generally. 
 
CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
 
Culture, Situationism, and Subjectivism 
 
One of the great lessons of social psychology has been to heighten our appreciation of the impact 
of social situations.  As a discipline, we pride ourselves on our refusal to make hasty or overly 
broad inferences about the traits or other personal dispositions of social actors, and we eschew 
explanations for undesirable human behavior that seem to "blame the victim" who responds 
undesirably to the pressures and constraints of difficult situations.  In turn, the goal of 
understanding the situational determinants of social actions and outcomes has historically 
obliged us to look beyond the obvious "objective" features of social situations and to focus 
instead on the subjective representations or construals of the actors involved (Ross and Ward 
1996). Indeed, these two lessons have been seen as among the most general and fundamental 
conclusions from the last half-century of research in social psychology (Ross and Nisbett 1991). 
Consequently, it seems more than a little ironic that American social psychologists have, 
until quite recently, paid so little attention to the topic of culture.  Surely there are few factors 
that can rival the power of cultural differences in determining both the objective situations in 
which people most often find themselves and the subjective interpretations they are likely to 
share about the meaning of those situations.  As Ross and Nisbett (1991) have suggested: 
 
Ethnic, racial, religious, regional, and even economic subcultures are in an important 
sense the distillates of historical situations, as well as powerful contemporary 
determinants of individuals' behavior.  They are, at the same time, important sources of 
the particular subjective meanings and construals we place upon the social events we 
observe. (170) 
 
Nonetheless, our collective search for seemingly context-free generalizations, based on 
"objective" study of interchangeable individual "subjects" who are divorced from their everyday 
social contexts and networks, seems, with few notable exceptions (McClelland et al. 1953), to 
have precluded serious attention to culture.  Fortunately, within the last few years this situation 
has begun to change and the study of cultural influences on social behavior has begun to enter 
the mainstream of social psychology. 
 
Individualism Versus Collectivism 
 
Perhaps the first major step toward the integration of cultural concerns into Western social 
psychology derived from pioneering studies by Triandis (1989, 1990, 1995) and others, 
especially Hofstede (1980, 1991).  These authors sought to characterize systematic variations in 
broad societal goals and values across different cultures, using methods that avoided the 
simplistic and one-sided comparisons of the ways in which “other" cultures differ from "our 
own" that so plagued most earlier cross-cultural research efforts. 
The most notable contribution of these researchers was the characterization of cultures 
along a dimension of individualism-collectivism (Hofstede 1980, 1991; Smith and Bond 1993; 
Triandis 1989, 1990, 1995).  However, the theoretical importance of this work lay not only in a 
general claim that one could observe and measure large and relatively stable cultural differences 
along this dimension, but also in a contention that Americans (and their close cultural kin, the 
British, Canadians, and Australians) displayed a level of individualism far above that 
characteristic of the rest of the world.  This finding, in turn, prompted a concern that broad 
conclusions based solely on research with American subjects might prove far more limited in 
their relevance to other societies than we had recognized. 
 
Independent Versus Interdependent Selves 
 
Despite its potential significance, for many years the impact of work on individualism versus 
collectivism remained relatively limited, and the relevant studies made little effective contact 
with more mainstream social psychological research of the time.  What eventually brought this 
work to the forefront of social psychology was the effort by Markus and Kitayama (1991) to 
analyze psychological mechanisms whereby this cultural variable might influence not only the 
abstract beliefs and presuppositions but also the basic goals and self-concepts of persons 
growing up in individualistic versus collectivistic cultures.  By focusing on the centrality of the 
self and by tying their analysis explicitly to current paradigms in experimental social 
psychology, Markus and Kitayama's paper paved the way for a resurgence of interest in issues of 
culture. 
Their basic argument was straightforward: Whereas the distinction between the 
individual and the group is critical to highly individualistic Americans, the relationship between 
individuals and their groups may be more fused or more diffuse in collectivist cultures.  In 
America, self-identity emphasizes the distinction between the "independent-self" and others—
with heroic individuals endeavoring to stand, as e. e. cummings suggests, as bounded, unique, 
and autonomous entities, largely uninfluenced by group and environmental pressures (Geertz 
1975; Johnson 1985; Sampson 1985, 1988, 1989; Waterman 1981).  In Markus and Kitayama's 
(1991) terms, "the independent-self is a construal of the self in which behavior is organized and 
made meaningful by reference to one's own internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and actions, 
rather than by reference to those of others" (226).  For such persons, preservation of individual 
integrity is essential to the self. 
By contrast, people in more collectivist cultures may have self-systems in which the 
distinction between the individual and the group is considerably more vague, because within 
these cultures the relationship between the individual and the social group involves much greater 
interconnectedness (Kondo 1982).  Markus and Kitayarna (1991) characterize such individuals 
as "interdependent-selves" who perceive themselves “as part of an encompassing social 
relationship" and recognize that their own actions are "determined, contingent on, and to a large 
extent organized by what the actor perceives to be the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others in 
the relationship" (227).  For such actors, conformity with the group may be seen as personally 
rewarding as well as socially sanctioned. 
In short, the distinction that Markus and Kitayama (1991) draw between individualists 
and collectivists highlights the relationship between the individual and the group, and the 
resultant differences in selfconcepts or construals.  These different types of cultures, they 
suggest, also differ in the ideals for conduct that they present and the culturally mandated goals 
for group members implied by these ideals.  Whereas members of individualistic cultures may be 
expected to promote their own goals, to express their own opinions, and to perceive themselves 
as unique, members of collectivistic cultures may be expected to promote others' goals, to 
express opinions appropriate to their group and position, and to strive to fit in and belong. 
In support of their analysis, Markus and Kitayarna (1991) report a number of empirical 
findings.  They suggest, for example, that Americans store more knowledge about themselves 
than they do about others, and that the Japanese store more knowledge about others than they do 
about themselves.  Other findings suggest that Asians are less likely than Americans to perceive 
the behaviors of others as stemming from personality traits, implying that they may not perceive 
others as separate entities to the same degree that Americans do (Bond 1983; Dalal, Sharma, and 
Bisht 1983; Miller 1984; Shweder and Bourne 1982).  Finally, the pervasive individualistic 
tendency to bolster esteem through self-enhancement (Greenwald 1980) may actually disappear 
in cultures that promote more interdependent views of the self.  Indeed, individuals from 
collectivist Asian cultures seem, in many social contexts, more inclined to deprecate their own 
abilities and contributions than to exaggerate them (Kitayama et al. 1997; Markus and Kitayama 
1991; Takata 1987). 
Subsequent efforts by others have added provocative details to this general picture.  In 
one particularly elegant research program, for example, Morris and Peng (1994) studied the 
explanations offered by participants from individualistic and collectivistic cultures when they 
observed animated "interactions" between individuals and groups—for example, when the 
distance between an individual and a group widened or narrowed.  Individualists, they reported, 
interpreted these abstract representations of interaction patterns in terms of the motives of the 
individual actor (for example, he or she "caught up with" or "ran away from" the group).  
Collectivists, by contrast, interpreted these abstract interactions in terms of the motives of the 
group (he or she was "taken into" or "expelled from" the group). 
Other research programs have examined related cultural differences between Anglo-
Americans and East Asians by exploring the generalizability or "transportability" of classic 
Western social psychological phenomena.  Many of these studies, thoughtfully reviewed by 
Norenzayan, Choi, and Nisbett (this volume) and by Kitayama and Masuda (1997), have focused 
particularly on the conditions and contexts in which dispositionalist personality theories, the 
correspondence bias, and the failure to utilize base-rate information effectively that characterize 
our culture seem to apply, or fail to apply, in different societies and/or different cultural 
subgroups within the larger American society. 
Despite their success in illustrating predicted cultural differences, most studies in this 
tradition retain a degree of ethnocentrism.  Almost invariably, it is noteworthy that these studies 
introduce a classic and well-studied Western experimental paradigm into other cultures, to see 
whether the same principles or processes will apply there.2 As a result, “our" paradigms and 
phenomena retain a position of inherent privilege, making it difficult for us to see the ways in 
which those paradigms, and the questions they give rise to, reflect basic assumptions of our own 
cultural heritage.  Consequently, we frequently fail to incorporate, even in explicitly cultural 
research, the sorts of conceptual distinctions, manipulations, measures, and other features of 
research design that, although generally irrelevant in our own society, might nevertheless be of 
critical significance in other cultures or in particular subgroups within our own culture. 
 
 
NEW RESEARCH: THE INGROUP-OUTGROUP DISTINCTION IN CULTURAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
In our own studies, to which we now turn, we have sought to introduce an important distinction 
relevant to Markus and Kitayama's (1991) analysis of independent versus interdependent 
cultures.  This distinction, which we believe may be of particular significance to individuals 
raised in collectivistic or interdependent cultures, centers on the dichotomy between ingroup and 
outgroup members. 
 
Attributions for Self Versus Others 
 
A first instance of experimental ethnocentrism that is of special relevance to our own research 
efforts is evident in the continuing discussion of actor-observer differences in attribution, and of 
the perceptual, cognitive, linguistic, and motivational factors underlying such differences (Bem 
1972; Jones and Nisbett 1971; Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Ross 1977). 
Accounts of cultures less individualistic than our own not only suggest a more 
interdependent, less autonomous view of the self but also suggest that as the self-other boundary 
becomes less distinct, the distinction between ingroup and outgroup members assumes greater 
significance.  That is, in linking the self intimately to others with whom one is interdependent 
(family, friends, and other ingroup members), the self and relevant ingroup members may 
become psychological entities prone to relatively similar inferential, judgmental, attributional, 
motivational, and perceptual biases.  By the same token, assimilating ingroup members to self 
may lead individuals to contrast ingroup and outgroup members more sharply, making them 
relatively more susceptible to different cognitive, perceptual, and motivational biases. 
We pursued the implications of this analysis in two attribution theory paradigms, both 
used initially to explore actor-observer differences (Jones and Nisbett 1971).  The first paradigm 
involved simple trait ascriptions, and the reported tendency for individuals to ascribe traits or 
dispositions more readily to others than to themselves.  The second paradigm concerned the 
choice of situational versus dispositional explanations for particular actions or outcomes, and the 
reported tendency for individuals to favor dispositional causes or explanations for others' 
behaviors but situational causes or explanations for their own. 
In both paradigms, we gave research participants of differing cultural backgrounds an 
opportunity to distinguish, in their attributions, between ingroup and outgroup members.  In both 
paradigms, our working hypothesis was that participants from collectivist backgrounds would 
make a sharper distinction between ingroup and outgroup.  In particular, we hypothesized that 
participants with Asian and/or Asian American backgrounds would ascribe fewer traits to 
ingroup members (but not to outgroup members) than would Caucasian Americans.  And we 
predicted that Asian Americans would offer more "charitable" attributions, that is, more 
situational ones, in explaining actions that could reflect negatively on ingroup members (but not 
those that could reflect negatively on outgroup members) than would Caucasian Americans. 
 
Trait Ascriptions for Ingroup Versus Outgroup Members In a first study, Iyengar and Ross 
(1996) examined the trait ascription phenomenon first demonstrated by Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, 
and Maracek (1973). In the context of a larger investigation of the divergent perceptions of 
actors and observers (Jones and Nisbett 1971), Nisbett and his colleagues (1973) had simply 
asked people to indicate whether one or the other of various pairs of personality trait descriptors 
("kind-unkind," "bold-timid," "extroverted-introverted," and so on) were descriptive of 
themselves and of various other actors, or whether they "couldn't say" because individual's 
behavior in that behavioral domain "depends on the situation." With American college students 
as research participants, the results of this investigation were clear.  Whereas the students readily 
ascribed trait descriptors to family members, friends, and even to public figures like the 
newscaster Walter Cronkite, they proved relatively reluctant to apply such descriptors to 
themselves, choosing instead to indicate that their own behavior in the relevant domains 
"depends on the situation." 
Iyengar and Ross (1996) adapted this procedure for the study of potential cultural 
differences. in particular, three types of respondents—one group of American Stanford 
University students of Caucasian descent (n = 92), a second group of Stanford students of Asian 
descent (n = 97), and a third group of Japanese students at Kyoto University (n = 57)—all 
responded to a version of the trait assessment instrument employed by Nisbett and his colleagues 
(1973).  The instrument, which used English for the Stanford respondents and a Japanese 
translation for the Kyoto students, included thirteen traits-some clearly positive ("kind," 
"friendly"), some clearly negative ("disagreeable," "overbearing"), and some more ambiguous or 
even likely to carry different valences in different cultures ("shy," "assertive").  Each respondent 
was asked to consider each trait with respect to three separate scales—one pertaining to self, one 
pertaining to his or her best friend, and one pertaining to some specific enemy of his or her own 
designation.  For each trait, they were simply asked to indicate "yes," "no," or "depends on the 
situation" with respect to each assessment target. 
The results of this simple exercise were revealing.  Figure 9.1 displays the data.  First, the 
Caucasian Stanford students chose "depends on the situation" significantly more often with 
respect to self than with respect to others, thereby replicating the basic finding of Nisbett and his 
colleagues (1973). In addition, these students proved almost as willing to apply simple trait 
descriptors to their close friend as to their enemy.  Japanese students at Kyoto University, 
however, responded very differently in rating these two types of others.  In rating friends, as in 
rating self, they were relatively more inclined to choose "depends on the situation"—indeed, 
they selected it significantly more often, in both cases, than did the Caucasian American students 
(a result consistent with the suggestion offered elsewhere in this volume that people from 
collectivistic cultures may be particularly sensitive to situational or social constraints).  In rating 
an outgroup member (an enemy), however, they rarely chose "depends on the situation" rather 
than assigning a trait—in fact, they did so significantly less often than the Caucasian students.  
In short, the contrast between assessments of friends and of enemies was more dramatic than the 
contrast between assessments of friends and self—a markedly different pattern of results than 
that obtained for the Caucasian students. 
Interestingly, our sample of Asian Americans and Asian foreign students attending 
Stanford showed an intermediate pattern of results.  Like the Kyoto students, they chose 
"depends on the situation" more often than the Caucasian students when characterizing 
themselves, and like the Kyoto sample, they made a clear distinction between friends and 
enemies in this regard.  But unlike the Kyoto students (and like the Caucasian American 
students), the distinction made between self and friends by these students exposed to both Asian 
and American views was also quite marked. 
Viewed in isolation, the findings for our Caucasian American sample (like the original 
Nisbett et al. [19731 results) suggest a strong and simple self-other distinction.  By contrast, as 
hypothesized, the findings friom the other two samples, featuring students with more 
collectivistic and less individualistic cultural backgrounds, remind us of the importance, even the 
centrality, of the ingroup-outgroup distinction in other societies. 
 
Attributional Charity Regarding Ingroup Versus Outgroup Members In a second study, Iyengar 
and Ross (1996) turned their attention to the phenomenon of attributional "charity," that is, the 
willingness of individuals to take into account situational pressures and constraints, especially in 
accounting for seemingly negative or antisocial actions (Griffin and Ross 1991).  In Western 
research, of course, the topic of biased attributional assessment, or "attributional charity," has 
typically focused on the self-serving biases or "ego defensiveness" shown by actors in explaining 
their own success or failures (see Nisbett and Ross 1980).  In this tradition, self-other 
comparisons are generally introduced to use attributions made by, or about, disinterested others 
as a relatively “objective" baseline against which to assess the potentially biased attributions that 
actors make about their own actions and outcomes. 
Once again, the unique feature of our present research design was the inclusion of the 
ingroup-versus-outgroup variable, allowing us to compare the attributional charity afforded to 
members of these two groups.  In particular, students in this study were asked to consider 
possible explanations for hypothetical negative actions or misdeeds by a resident of their 
dormitory.  Two groups of respondents were employed—one group of Caucasian Americans (n 
= 104) and one group of first-generation Americans of Asian descent (n = 60)—all of whom 
lived in mixed-ethnicity dormitories in which roughly half of the students were of Caucasian 
ancestry and one-quarter were of Asian ancestry.  All students read four vignettes.  Two featured 
negative actions (for example, failure to stop and help a fellow student who had crashed his or 
her bicycle) by an actor stipulated to be a "friend," and two featured similarly negative actions 
by an unspecified stranger (that is, someone in the dorm whom the student had not yet met).  For 
each action, students were given a small set of charitable (that is, exculpatory, situational) 
explanations (for example, the individual failing to render aid was in a hurry and didn't notice the 
accident) and a small set of dispositional explanations involving negative traits (for example, the 
individual failing to render aid was an uncaring person).  Students were also invited to add 
explanations of their own if they wished.  The aptness or likelihood of each stipulated 
explanation was assessed using simple seven-point rating scales. 
Figure 9.2 shows the results of this study, which once again revealed a clear difference in 
the two groups' assessments.  The Caucasian students showed virtually no tendency to make 
more charitable attributions for specified friends than for unspecified strangers, displaying in 
both cases a moderate preference for dispositional explanations over situational ones.  By 
contrast, the Asian Americans showed a clear tendency to make more charitable, less censorious 
attributions about friends than about strangers; that is, they moderately preferred situational 
explanations over dispositional ones for friends, but strongly preferred dispositional explanations 
over situational ones for strangers. In fact, the Asian Americans opted for dispositional 
explanations in making attributions about strangers more often than did the Caucasian 
Americans. 
Thus, if viewed in isolation, the findings from the Caucasian American sample would 
lead one to discount the existence of ingroup favoritism in the attribution process—at least for 
the particular actions and the particular ingroups and outgroups identified in our vignettes.  By 
contrast, if viewed in isolation, the results from the Asian American sample would suggest a 
strong tendency toward such ingroup favoritism.  It is unfortunate that the design of this second 
1yengar and Ross (1996) study did not allow us to examine charitableness toward self in the 
attribution process, and equally unfortunate that the study did not include a sample of Asian 
respondents in their own land.3  But the data we do have suffice once again to illustrate that 
generalizations about how individuals make attributions about "others" can become 
problematic—once we leave the confines of our own culture—unless we make some effort to 
identify the precise relationship of that "other" to the individual. 
 
Intrinsic Motivation and the Restriction of Choice by Ingroup Versus Outgroup Members 
 
The second research domain in which the significance of these cultural variables has been 
explored involves the determinants of intrinsic motivation—in particular, the role that individual 
choice and personal control may play in motivating individuals from highly individualistic 
cultures, compared to those from more socially interdependent cultures.  Let us turn, then, to this 
last line of investigation. 
Choice is good. What, a typical American might ask, could be more self-evident? 
Liberty, after all, is enshrined as subordinate only to life itself in our country's Declaration of 
Independence.  Having a choice, obviously, gives individuals the opportunity to select the 
options that most closely match their personal needs and preferences.  In addition, as Markus and 
Kitayama's (1991) analysis would suggest, choice permits people to express their individuality 
and display their autonomy. 
In fact, the value of personal choice has long seemed obvious to American theorists 
studying the nature of intrinsic motivation.  Indeed, the single most widespread and influential 
definition of intrinsic motivation, put forward by Deci and his colleagues (Deci 1981; Deci and 
Ryan 1985), virtually equates the experience of intrinsic motivation with a sense of "self-
determination" or personal choice.  People want to feel themselves, as another prominent 
American theorist put it (deCharms 1968), to be "origins" of their own actions, rather than 
"pawns" of external forces. 
In fact, one line of intrinsic motivation research has focused quite directly on the effects 
of the presence or absence of personal choice.  For example, in a prototypic study, Zuckerman, 
Porac, Lathin, Smith, and Deci (1978) presented undergraduates with a set of interesting 
manipulative puzzles.  In the choice condition, students were told they could choose which 
puzzles to work with and how long to spend with each; in the no-choice condition, the 
experimenter told students which puzzles to work on and when, yoking the actions of these 
students to those of the students in the choice condition.  At the end of this test period, intrinsic 
motivation was measured by the amount of unmonitored free-play time that students 
subsequently chose to spend with the puzzles and by their self-reports of willingness to 
participate in further tests with such puzzles.  The results provided a clear demonstration that 
students who had been given a choice showed significantly more intrinsic motivation, on both 
behavioral and self-report measures, than no-choice subjects.4 
In two related studies, Iyengar and Lepper (1999) added to this basic paradigm of choice 
versus no-choice one further condition suggested by our theoretical analysis of the potential 
importance of the identity of the other.  In these additional groups, students were assigned 
particular activities, not by an unfamiliar experimenter, as in traditional no-choice conditions, 
but by someone who would be expected to be included in the more extended, interdependent 
concept of self manifested by children of Asian backgrounds. In a first study, this key "ingroup" 
member making choices for the child was the child's own mother, and the "outgroup" member 
making such choices remained the experimenter (with whom the child had not previously been 
acquainted).  In a second study, choices in the "ingroup-choice" condition were made by the 
students' own classmates; choices in the "outgroup-choice" condition were made by children in a 
lower grade at a rival school across town.  To test our hypotheses about the differential relevance 
of this group membership manipulation for children from individualistic versus collectivistic 
cultures, these experimental procedures were employed with samples of children from 
theoretically contrasting cultural backgrounds. 
In the first study, third-grade children were asked to do an anagrams task for a specified 
period of time. In the "personal-choice" condition these children were asked which of six 
categories of anagrams (including animals, family, foods) they would like to undertake. in the 
two imposed-choice conditions, children were assigned categories that had been yoked to those 
selected by students in the choice condition.  Thus, in the outgroup-choice condition, as in 
previous research, the experimenter simply displayed the choices and asserted that he or she 
wanted the child to work with the category specified.  In the novel ingroup-no-choice condition, 
by contrast, the experimenter looked through a large set of consent forms and then told the child 
that his or her own mother had suggested the anagram category. In each of these conditions, of 
course, half of the children were from Anglo-American backgrounds, and the other half were 
from Asian American backgrounds. 
Two main measures were obtained: initial task performance, as assessed by the number 
of anagrams children actually completed correctly during the experimental period, and 
subsequent intrinsic motivation, as assessed by the children's further play with the anagrams after 
the purported end of the experiment, a time when the children believed themselves to be entirely 
on their own. 
Figures 9.3 and 9.4 display the results, which were highly significant and comparable for 
both measures.  For the Anglo-American children, level of performance and intrinsic motivation 
were clearly highest in the personal-choice condition and were equally low in the two imposed-
choice conditions, regardless of whether a stranger experimenter or their own mother had 
"usurped" their choices.  For the Asian American children, by contrast, performance and 
motivation were both highest in the ingroup-choice condition (in which their mothers had 
selected the category of anagrams for them), next highest in the personal-choice condition, and 
lowest in the outgroup-choice condition.5 
The second study, examining ingroup versus outgroup choices, involved a rather 
different context and manipulation. it employed an educational computer activity designed to 
teach students about arithmetic equations via an instructional game that had been developed in 
previous research by Cordova and Lepper (1996).  Built into this game were half a dolzen 
instructionally irrelevant choices, such as which of four icons would represent one's own "ship" 
during the game and which icon would represent one's opponent.  In this prior study, Cordova 
and Lepper had shown that the provision of even such apparently trivial choices could produce 
large educational benefits with Caucasian American pupils.  Students who had been given these 
choices showed significantly enhanced performance at the game, increased liking of the game, 
higher levels of perceived self-efficacy, and greater subsequent learning from the game than 
children not given such choice.  These effects were apparent not only as the children played the 
game during the initial experimental session but also in follow-up measures taken outside the 
computer game context a week later. 
In their second study, Iyengar and Lepper (1999) employed the same instructional  
computer game, but with the modifications necessary to create two contrasting imposed-choice 
conditions in addition to the standard choice condition, fifth-grade students were told that the 
relevant choices had already been made based on ballot previously distributed in their own 
classrooms. In the outgtoup-choice condition, on the other hand, the fifth-graders were told that 
these same choices had already been made based on a vote by a group of younger outgroup 
members—that is, third-graders at a rival school.  Once again, of course, half of the students 
were of Anglo-American heritage, and the other half were from Asian American families. 
The results from this study were again relatively dramatic.  Figures 9.5 and 9.6 display 
the findings from representative measures of intrinsic motivation and subsequent learning.  Once 
again, for Anglo-American students, the personal-choice condition produced far higher levels of 
motivation and learning than the imposed-choice conditions, regardless of whether the 
instructional choices in these latter groups were said to have been based on the preferences of 
their own classmates or on those of younger children from a rival school.  For Asian American 
students, by contrast, it was the ingroup versus outgroup distinction that proved critical.  
Motivation and learning were clearly highest in the ingroup-choice condition, where the choices 
were purportedly those of one's own classmates, intermediate in the personal-choice condition, 
and lowest in the outgroup-choice condition.6 
In short, in both of these studies the only crucial distinction for the Anglo-American 
students seems to have been that between the self and others.  For the Asian American students, 
by contrast, the more important distinction was that between ingroup (including the self) and 
outgroup.  Taken in combination with our prior studies of trait ascriptions and attributional 
charity, these findings provide substantial support for our analysis of the crucial significance of 
the ingroup-outgroup distinction in studies of individualistic and independent versus 




It is no accident that interest in the topic of culture, especially interest in cultural differences 
between ourselves and others from the highly collectivistic cultures of East Asia, has surged in 
the past decade or so.  Not only have we seen unprecedented East-West traffic in trade, tourism, 
immigration, and cultural exchange, but with the end of the cold war and our bilateral rivalry 
with the Soviet Union, China and Japan have increasingly occupied our attention and have 
become the target of our doubts and fears, especially as they increasingly assert themselves on 
the world stage. 
Exposure to other cultures, and increasingly to the scholarship of social scientists who 
live and work in other cultures, offers us a window not only on the limitations of our own "local" 
psychology but also on the nature of our highly individualistic culture and our way of looking at 
ourselves and our interpersonal relations. As every seasoned traveler can attest, the time we 
spend in other lands (and to a lesser extent, the contact we have with travelers from other lands) 
gives us a sharper, more nuanced appreciation of what we share with other cultures and what is 
distinctive about our own.  Although we may misinterpret what we see in other cultures, travel 
helps us, if we may modify Shweder's (1991) apropos phrase, to "see" culture rather than simply 
"see through" it. And when we return, although we may feel relief or comfort at being "home," 
we often feel somewhat alien in that home for a period, experiencing real nostalgia for the 
different ways of feeling, seeing, relating, or being that we left behind. 
 
Naive Realism, Conflict, and Misunderstanding 
 
Elsewhere, one of the present authors (Griffin and Ross 1991; Ross and Ward 1996) has 
discussed the concept of “naive realism.” Central to this everyday epistemological stance is the 
conviction, generally implicit rather than explicit, that our own perceptions and feelings, and our 
own social and ethical priorities and judgments, are somehow “normal” or “natural” responses to 
the objective, unmediated reality of events (or to the objective merits of relevant claims and 
arguments).  In turn, these beliefs lead to the further conviction that, to the extent that,the 
perceptions, feelings, or priorities of other individuals or groups differ from our own, such 
responses are not normal or natural but must rather be "mediated" by distorting ideology or self-
interest.  The general relevance of this egocentric stance, coupled with the findings reported in 
this chapter, is worth exploring with respect to intercultural misunderstanding and conflict. 
Consider the practice of nepotism (or similar instances of ingroup favoritism).  As 
individualistic, independent Westerners, we see this practice as corrupt, unfair, and exclusionary, 
and we see our attempts to regulate such bias as a natural, enlightened, progressive attempt to 
give individuals the "impartial" and individual consideration to which they justly are entitled.  
We have similar reactions to the attempts of foreign corporations to maintain exclusive, closed, 
cooperative links between manufacturers, suppliers, and local markets.  That is, we see these 
traditional practices as an unfair, unwise failure to let the "invisible hand" of the market operate 
so that individual greed can maximize individual and collective welfare alike. 
One strongly suspects that collectivist observers, holding more interdependent views of 
self, would regard as "natural" attempts to reward loyalty and constancy and to distinguish 
kinsmen, friends, or others to whom we have ingroup, ties from mere acquaintances or even 
strangers who are interested only in advancing their own immediate economic interests.  
Collectivists would feel no particular need to explain or justify their cultural practices; instead, 
they might well feel compelled to search for the peculiar biases that underlie our practices and 
institutions, to explain our seeming fickleness or the almost pathological pursuit of wealth and 
power "for its own sake" that seems embodied in our "Protestant ethic" (McClelland et al. 1953; 
Weber 1905/1984).  Indeed, they might be particularly hard-pressed to explain the respect we 
give to driven men and women who seem content, even overjoyed, to run things as disinterested 
stewards, rather than advancing and protecting the interests of those tied to them by blood or 
lifelong relationships. 
A similar clash of cultures involving issues of impartiality versus favoritism may play 
itself out in disputes about affirmative action, although here the issue is complicated by the 
particular historical experiences of America's immigrant groups. on the one hand, the notion of 
group-based entitlements or sharing of resources and power may be more congenial to Asians, 
who may also be less offended than Americans of Western European backgrounds by such 
policies' seeming violation of individualistic notions of fairness or meritocratic "open" 
competition.  On the other hand, Asians, like many historical immigrant groups, may be 
particular loath (especially in the realm of education) to see the individualist competition 
(featuring seemingly objective test scores, grade point averages, and other "color-blind" criteria) 
given less weight when it is precisely that competition that has enabled them to win entrance in 
the face of hegemonic groups' indifference or even hostility to their aspirations.  Certainly, such 
issues are apt to add new complexities as our increasingly culturally diverse society struggles 
with historic issues of group inequality. 
Situations involving the display of independence or the exercise of choice raise similar 
possibilities for misunderstanding and even conflict.  Relatively independent Westerners may 
attribute personal reticence, the unwillingness to criticize peers or express strong opinions in 
group settings (especially settings in which they, as outgroup members, are present), or the 
reluctance to champion one's own proposals to a lack of confidence, a lack of courage, or even a 
lack of leadership potential.  More interdependent non-Westerners, by contrast, may see displays 
of Western assertiveness as inappropriately self-serving, overbearing, or lacking in respect for 
others.  Moreover, the members of both cultures are apt to see their own assessments of the 
others' responses as natural, culture-free, objective, and accurate.  And they are apt to see the 
others' assessments of them as the result of the peculiar cultural lenses that those on "the other 
side" bring to the task of social perception. 
Anecdotal instances of cultural differences in practice, and interpretation, with regard to 
the exercise of personal choice should similarly be familiar to every traveler.  The Western 
visitor to Japan who finds that her host at a fine restaurant has ordered the same meal for 
everyone is apt to interpret such behavior as an exercise of social control and a restriction of her 
own freedom to experiment or to cater to her own idiosyncratic tastes.  The same diner, however, 
may not see anything odd about her own considerable reluctance to order exactly the same 
combination of appetizer and entree as the friend ordering before her (much less to choose the 
same dress or exactly the same landscaping scheme as her neighbor) lest she be seen as a mere 
"copycat." 
In similar fashion, parental involvement with children's schoolwork is likely, in this 
country, to be rejected by children themselves as oppressive and intrusive interference in their 
affairs and may often be proscribed by their teachers as ethically inappropriate.  In collectivistic 
societies, in contrast, such involvement may be welcomed by children and teachers alike and is 
likely to be viewed as a sign of mutual dependence and support (Stevenson and Chen 1989).  In 
addition, individualist and collectivist cultures are likely to display correspondingly divergent 
beliefs about the empirical consequences of such parental practices for children's eventual 
learning. 
Even the current emphasis in applied psychology on the benefits of self-efficacy and 
personal responsibility-taking may reflect these same cultural blinders.  In America, we herald 
impressive findings on the educational and health benefits of feeling in control, taking 
responsibility, or having a positive attributional style wherein failures are attributed to 
controllable personal factors (Bandura 1997; Seligman 1992).  We read books and magazine 
articles about the need to take charge of our own breast cancer, AIDS, or heart disease, rather 
than leave it to the sole care of medical professionals.  Conversely, we are shocked to discover 
that in many Asian societies it is considered an affront to one's physician to ask why a particular 
treatment is being undertaken or exactly how it works.  And we are horrified to learn that precise 
diagnoses and prognoses are generally withheld from terminally ill Asian patients (only their 
relatives are given the relevant information), because we are convinced that we would want to 
know all and can cite chapter and verse about the benefits to patients of accurate knowledge and 
an active role in dealing with the management of pain and other symptoms. 
In short, we are likely to read relevant experimental and popular literatures with a sense 
that existential truths, not peculiarities of local culture, are being revealed.  And once again, even 
when we come to appreciate cultural differences and learn to avoid making such overly broad 
generalizations or characterological assumptions, we may still retain the belief that our 
preferences and experiences are "natural" and essential, while those of other cultures are to be 
understood in terms of the specific, distinctive, features of collectivist or Confucian or Asian 
cultures. 
 
Concerns and Caveats 
 
While it is important to recognize cultural differences and to shed the egocentrism and 
ethnocentrism that mar or at least limit much of our work, there are some dangers to be avoided.  
In emphasizing differences, or even in chiding our colleagues for their unwarranted 
universalism, we can fall prey to excesses of our own.  Recent research in our laboratory shows 
that pro-choice and pro-life factions, affirmative action opponents and proponents, and even men 
and women typically overestimate their differences both in factual assumptions and in construals 
of relevant information (Robinson et al. 1995).  We suspect that so-called individualists and 
collectivists may similarly overestimate rather than underestimate their differences and may, as a 
result, despair unnecessarily about the prospects for finding common ground. 
A related danger is that of overestimating the homogeneity, or underestimating the 
variability, to be found within cultures (especially the “other” culture).  Closer examination is 
likely to reveal that "our" individualism may be more domain-specific (and more restricted to 
particular subcultures) than we recognize, and closer examination will surely reveal that the 
labels "collectivist" and "interdependent" are far too broad and undiscriminating to capture the 
diversity, or fully alert us to the basis, of intercultural differences.  We would all be well served, 
for example, by separating collectivist norms from Confucianist ones (see Dien 1997), and we 
would do well to recognize that Hindus, Moslems, Japanese, Koreans, and Chinese (to say 
nothing of the different subcultures within each of these larger groups) are likely to be 
substantially less impressed than us by their similarities and more attuned than us to their 
differences. 
Finally, in our haste to embrace cultural differences, we run the risk of overlooking 
similarities that are deep and informative.  Despite our much-vaunted "individualism," it is 
important to recognize the deep communitarian strain that runs through our history and the 
American penchant for creating philanthropic and voluntary associations to coordinate the joint 
undertakings of communities (Bellah 1996; Etzioni 1996; de Tocqueville 1848/1969).  
Americans can also benefit from the nurturance and support of their peers, as suggested by 
research on the survival of breast cancer patients in support groups (Dunkel-Schetter et al. 1992; 
Spiegel 1992; Spiegel and Bloom 1983) and the success of group study in aiding minority 
calculus students (Treisman 1985). 
We are confident that further research will reveal domains, practices, and institutions 
within which collectivists manifest their own strivings for efficacy and channels of self-
expression, if not individualism. (Or perhaps we Westerners simply do not understand how 
karioke, surno wrestling, and martial arts are expressions of collectivist rather than individualist 
strivings).  We are equally confident that the distinction between ingroups and outgroups will 
emerge as critical in at least some important attribution and choice domains within the American 
context. In short, we expect the future of cultural psychology to offer a more nuanced 
appreciation of the "other," as well as more subtle techniques for avoiding and overcoming 




1. The basis for this characterization seems clear.  American social psychologists studying 
interpersonal processes have consistently excluded from their studies participants in 
continuing relationships. (Predictably, the main recent exception involves research on 
romantic relationships, although even there the focus is often on initial attraction rather 
than on the evolving or ongoing features of the relationship itself.) Even when intergroup 
or intragroup dynamics are the focus of investigation, it is generally previously 
unacquainted individuals and/or arbitrarily defined groups that are studied.  And when 
such group dynamics are not the focus of attention, we invariably study responses to 
actions by, communications from, or even written information about, strangers—rather 
than friends, family members, coworkers, or others in long-term relationships.  In a 
sense, relational and social contexts are treated as sources of noise, or even bias, to be 
eliminated in the search for "basic" underlying processes and functional relationships 
between variables. 
 
2. The ethnocentricity of American cross-cultural research was even more blatant in 
previous decades.  Most of the time, researchers would directly export specific 
experimental paradigms, such as those of Asch (1951), Milgram (1963), or Darley and 
Latane (1968)—even though, as this brief list suggests, many of these paradigms were 
designed to capture the events or problems of particular points in our social history—for  
 study in a variety of foreign capitals determined more by happenstance or opportunity 
than by any theoretical analysis of the features of the relevant cultures.  But even in the 
present, more culturally attuned era (and even in the context of challenging universalist 
assumptions), much research still begins by asking whether "our" self-perception, 
dissonance reduction, or attribution findings apply in those “other” cultures, with their 
different social concerns, religious beliefs, epistemologies, or ideologies.  Rarely if ever 
do researchers start with other cultures and consider what lessons, specific phenomena, or 
functional relations observed within them might hold about the nature of human 
psychology (or rather, the range of possible human psychologies). 
 
3. One additional difference in the methodologies of the first two studies may merit more 
emphasis and discussion.  Whereas students in the first study offered trait attributions 
about specific others (a friend and an enemy of their own designation), students in the 
second study offered causal attributions about hypothetical others (a "friend" and a 
"stranger" named, but not otherwise described, in the relevant scenario).  Thus, it is not 
clear whether actual misdeeds by specific flesh-and-blood others would have yielded the 
same lack of ingroup favoritism among our Caucasian American participants, or the same 
pattern of differences between the Caucasian Americans and Asian Americans.  On the 
other hand, it is noteworthy that even the generic designation of "friend" or "stranger" 
was sufficient to invoke ingroup favoritism among our Asian American students—a hint, 
perhaps, that such favoritism may be culturally scripted among out presumably 
interdependent collectivists but absent (or perhaps dependent on the specific knowledge 
and relational bonds entailed in an actual friendship) among our presumably independent 
individualists. 
 
4. A similar set of processes can be seen in earlier, related Western research demonstrating 
the detrimental effects of superfluous extrinsic rewards on children's intrinsic motivation 
(Condry 1977; Deci and Ryan 1985; Lepper and Greene 1978; Lepper, Greene, and 
Nisbett 1973).  As these studies show, in our country, inducing children to engage in 
activities of high initial intrinsic interest in order to obtain some extrinsic reward or to 
meet some extrinsic constraint typically undermines their intrinsic motivation and task 
performance. 
 
5. The apparent difference between Asian and Caucasian Americans within the personal-
choice conditions, in both this and the next study, proved statistically significant only for 
the two intrinsic motivation measures (figures 9.3 and 9.5) and not for the two 
performance/learning measures (figures 9.4 and 9.6), although all four comparisons were 
clearly in the same direction. 
 
6. There is one comment worth adding to this seemingly straightforward account of 
methods and results.  Both studies present an interesting problem of interpretation, 
particularly with respect to the Asian children's choices.  That is, it is difficult to 
determine whether it was a matter of choice versus no choice (or freedom to express one's 
individuality versus restriction of that freedom) or a matter of correct choice versus 
potentially incorrect choice (or appropriate choice versus potentially inappropriate 
choice).  In these studies, as in many others, it can be difficult to determine how much 
cultural differences are manifested in people's different responses to objectively defined 
situations or manipulations or in the different ways in which people subjectively construe 
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